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Though it would be trite to describe eighteenth century Cochabam ba 
as a region of paradoxes, there is perhaps no other way to account for 
the contradictions and discrepancies of so many European reports on the 
region. Reliable and astute colonial observers like the Intendants Fran­
cisco de V iedm a, Francisco Paula Sanz and the Czech naturalist Tadeo 
H aenke at times seemed to view local society through stereopticons that 
rarely brought the two images into sharp focus.1 After touring the val­
leys, European observers would often adm ire the ’’opulent haciendas of 
maize and w heat” and ’’excellent pastures that nourish multitudes of 
sheep,” while lam enting the region’s cash -  hungry hacendados. V iedma, 
for example, described in detail C ochabam ba’s craft industries and 
bustling peasant markets. Yet he characterized the peasants and urban 
plebe as chronically idle and slothful. And while he invariably noted the 
strong acculturative forces at work in the largest ’’mestizo province” of 
Alto Peru, he warned against the ’’indigenization” of colonial customs and 
language, as Q uechua increasingly ’’contam inated” the speech of the 
creoles. And, finally, the very statistics on trade and prices that V iedm a 
compiled in the 1780’s and 1790’s seemed to contradict his own genera­
lizations about the region’s alleged over -  abundance of wheat and 
maize in most agricultural years as well as his assumption that Cocha­
bam ba exported little grain or cotton cloth to the markets o f the Alti­
plano.^
T o be sure, eighteenth century C ochabam ba did not ’’fit” the domi­
nant Andean mold -  if indeed there was one. It was neither an Indian 
region, like the neighboring province of C hayanta where hacendados 
never displaced nor marginalized Indian village society; nor was it an 
intensive monocultural zone like the nearby coca -  producing province of
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C hulum ani.^ Since the sixteenth century the cereal haciendas had 
become the dominant agrarian structure, originally producing for the 
silver mines of Potosí and, to a lesser extent, O ruro. By the eighteenth 
century the regional economy had experienced something of an economic 
involution, as landowners’ commercial profits were pinched by the 
long -  term  contraction in demand for their foodcrops at the highland 
mines and as the hacendados faced growing competition from peasant 
smallholders. T he proliferation of small -  scale wheat, maize and potato 
cultivators who (crop yields perm itting or scarcity dictating) regularly 
participated in the product and labor markets were, of course, internally 
differentiated. And a narrow layer of peasant producers managed to 
prosper and accumulate; but their m eager gains rarely spelled peasant 
proprietorship and freedom from rent.
In fact, material conditions probably deteriorated for most valley 
peasants over the course of the eighteenth century, as colonial authorities 
imposed new burdens and liens on the peasant household. T o wit, the 
rural population of Cochabam ba supported one of the largest (in absolute 
terms) legal yearly repartos (or forced distribution of merchandise) 
between 1754 and 1780.  ^ And after the Bourbons systematized tribute 
collection in the late 1770’s, they levied tax (at six pesos, two reales -  
one of the stiffest rates in Alto Peru) on the forasteros of the province.'' 
In addition, rapidly growing population in the valley of Cliza and other 
parts of the region placed more pressure on productive resources and 
swelled the ranks of the impoverished and rootless. These ’’structural 
factors” placed a downward pressure on many peasant households and 
cut into the thin margin of social insurance most families relied upon in 
their struggle against the endemic uncertainities o f agrarian life, where 
normally grain harvests could double and halve from  one year to the 
next.
I. Agrarian Origins o f  Industry
How did peasants on valley haciendas shape their economic lives to 
guarantee themselves a stable livelihood from  one year to the next? 
Despite all the liens that the state, the church and individual landlords 
placed on the surplus product of peasant labor, peasants who inhabited 
hacienda lands in the central valleys were commercially oriented when­
ever nature afforded them  an abundant or good harvest. T he small­
holders of Cochabam ba were notorious for their commercial activities 
and networks of ferias which provided the mechanism for the distribution
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of food crops, seeds, and m anufactured goods throughout most of the 
region.*’ But while small -  scale peasant marketing certainly undermined 
landlord monopoly, farm ing alone usually offered little chance for most 
households to radically improve their standard of living. T his was 
especially so as population pressure increased in the late eighteenth 
century in the central valley and agricultural prices throughout Alto Peru 
tended to stagnate during the latter part of the eighteenth century, 
according to a prelim inary study of commodity prices over the course of 
this century.^ O ut of the countervailing forces of population pressure and 
local commercial opportunity, many peasants began to diversify their 
economic activities and turn to petty crafts and trade. Capital -  poor and 
land -  short, country people channelled their labor (”the idle hands” for 
which local authorities had such contempt) into industry.® Alongside 
producción parcelaría in the central valleys arose multifarious cottage 
industries: chicha making (in Cliza and the Cercado), lum ber and 
carpentry (in Sacaba), soap, g lass-b low ing  and gunpowder workshops 
(in Cliza) and, most importantly, cotton textiles (in Quillacollo and the 
Cercado).®
C ochabam ba’s primitive cotton textile industry developed late, during 
the second half of the eighteenth century. Unlike the production of 
woolens which predom inated in the western provinces of the Altiplano, 
cotton m anufacturing in the valleys was a dispersed, cottage industry that 
sprang up in the towns of C ochabam ba, T ara ta , and Quillacollo and 
the surrounding countryside.10 It did not entirely displace textile manu­
facturing in obrajes, where rural laborers were engaged as spinners and 
weavers under deplorable conditions, at the comm and of their landlord or 
employer who owned the looms and other instrum ents of production. 
O n many haciendas peasants were forced to spin and weave, as well as 
to cultivate their lord’s lands. In  the 1780’s, the male tenants of the 
hacienda C aporaya in the Calliri river valley, for example, had to 
sentence their wives to the workshops of the hacienda where they turned 
wool and cotton into yarn and wove cloth, all as part of their labor 
ren t.11
But on most haciendas, including Caporaya, peasants wove bayetas 
and other rustic woolen cloth, under orders of their landlord, mainly for 
home consumption. Cochabam ba had few commercial obrajes in the late 
eighteenth century, and as a result, the region imported from  distant 
provinces most of its rustic woolen cloth.
A sample of one fifth of the colonial goods that entered the province 
in various years between 1777 and 1808, which were taxed and regis-
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tered in the royal alcabala accounts, reveals that rustic cloth destined for
peasant consumption was the principal item of import. 12 V arious types
of bayeta generated almost 30 percent of the tax value of the total
num ber (1,313) of goods sampled. Rustic clothing imports added another
12 percent of the tax value, so that cheap woolen cloth and clothing for
peasant consumers represented almost half of the value of all taxable
merchandise that entered the province. O brajes and workshops in the
highland provinces of La Paz and north of Lake Titicaca, especially
around Cuzco, supplied the Cochabam ba valleys with most of its woolen 
1 3imports. T hus, while the cost of cotton textile production was generally 
higher than spinning and weaving woolen cloth, especially where there 
was no local supply of raw cotton, the competition from  the small 
workshops (chorillos) and obrajes of the highlands compelled the artisans 
of Cochabam ba to turn to tocuyo p roduction .^
Tocuyo  was the cloth of the laboring poor. It was a rustic, undyed 
cotton textile that Indians and mestizos used .15 T he Intendant of the city 
of Arequipa, another center of tocuyo m anufacture, explained in his 
M em orias ’’that the plebe  wears tocuyo cloth as undergarm ents.”15 
Tocuyos were considerably cheaper than the dyed cotton cloth of Q uito, 
and after 1780 local rustic cotton cloth edged the fam ous quiteño textiles 
out of the m arket.17 But the crude and plain cloth never spontaneously 
replaced the finer cottons and woolen textiles imported from Europe. 
T he prosperous consumers in the valleys continued to purchase European 
cloth in abundance, "draining the province of scarce m oney,” Intendant 
Francisco de Viedm a complained in 1788.18 C ochabam ba’s tocuyeros 
sent some of their product to distant markets, but stiff competition from 
European textile m anufacturers restricted their markets to the local ones. 
Local producers were even more hard put to overcome the logistics of 
transit time, weight, bulk and profitability entailed in long -  distance, 
overland trade once Spain opened Spanish ports in 1778, including the 
great port of Barcelona, for direct trade with Buenos Aires. T he C row n’s 
’’free trade” policy and state subsidies for Spanish textile m anufacturing 
stimulated the rapid growth o f cotton cloth production in the metropolis. 
In only a decade (1775 to 1784), the production of cotton textiles in 
Spain increased threefold, and Barcelona became a m ajor cloth supplier 
to the Viceroyalty of La P la ta .19 Furtherm ore, the tocuyeros of Cocha­
bam ba confronted British contraband traders who introduced cheap, 
m ass-p ro d u ced  cotton textiles from the factories of M anchester and the 
rustic calicoes from India .20 T he relatively late development of the textile 
industry in C ochabam ba, its primitive nature, the crude quality of the
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cloth, and the difficulty of procuring raw cotton from distant sources of 
supply created formidable obstacles which (without drastic disruption of 
international trade) neither enterprising artisans nor shrewd merchants in 
Cochabam ba could hope to overcom e.21 U nder ’’norm al” circumstances, 
then, the textile industry of Cochabam ba was oriented toward the con­
sumption of the laboring classes, both urban and rural, and subject to 
the constraints of a narrow market.
C ontem porary sources defy precise estimate of the num ber of people 
who were engaged in cloth production and marketing in C ochabam ba. In 
1788 Viedm a mentioned that 500 cholos and mestizos occupied them­
selves in cloth m anufacturing in the parish of Q uillacollo.22 But a 
plethora of small workshops also peppered the parishes of the Cercado 
and T arata . M any years later, in 1804, Ju an  Carillo de Albornoz made 
reference to some 3,000 tocuyo weavers in the province.23 T he num ber 
of women and children engaged in spinning, dyeing and marketing 
tocuyos probably trebled that estimate, so that perhaps eight or ten 
thousand people were involved in one o r another stage of production or 
distribution during peak output. This m ay well be a conservative esti­
mate. In his 1827 report on potential market and investment opportuni­
ties in Bolivia, the British envoy John  Barclay Pentland estimated that as 
many as 20,000 people in the province fashioned raw cotton into 
tocuyos during the 1790’s.2^ In any event, we can say with reasonable 
certainty that Cochabam ba fa r surpassed the province of A requipa, its 
closest competitor, in the volume of tocuyo production in this period. 
T he Intendant Barriga reported in the late 1780’s that in the town 
environs of A requipa weavers produced at least 124,000 varas of cloth 
each year.25 This output hardly compared to the 300,000 varas of cloth 
that merchants in Cochabam ba dispatched to distant marketplaces in the 
same period.26 And that estimate apparently excludes the bulk of the 
cloth destined for local consumption. Cochabam ba was probably the 
largest producer of tocuyos in the Andes. Tadeo H aenke, the Czech 
naturalist who resided in Cochabam ba for many years, apparently 
thought as m uch:”...th e  Province of C ochabam ba ... consumes [as much 
cotton] in its looms as all the other [provinces] com bined.”22
For all the growth and promise of the textile industry in C ochabam ­
ba, curiously little information was left to us about the industrial organ­
ization of tocuyo production. Haenke often referred to the primitive 
conditions under which people worked. ”As I mentioned earlier,” he 
wrote in 1799, ’’one finds industry in these towns in its first infancy ... 
T he utensils, instrum ents, and some of the looms are poorly constructed
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and lack the use of those [English] machines that facilitate and abbrevi­
ate the different tasks”.28 T he power looms and other machinery that 
would have speeded up and standardized cloth procution in Cochabam ba 
was, of course, turning the cities of M anchester and Belfast into textile 
workshops of the world and launching England’s Industrial Revolution.
But in these Andean pockets of commercial textile production, 
non -  capitalist social relations predominated. T he labor process was 
divided essentially into three phases: the preparatory work of cleaning 
and plying and spinning cotton; weaving cloth on the treadle looms; and 
stretching and dyeing the finished cloth. In many cases this last process 
was eliminated, and unbleached, undyed tocuyos were sold and used. A 
rudim entary division of labor existed, as workers engaged in one or 
another of the stages of production. W omen and children performed 
what H aenke called the ’’auxiliary tasks” of cleaning, spinning the wool, 
and stretching and dyeing the finished cloth. These tasks were more time 
consuming, and fem ale spinners generally outnum bered male weavers 
by more than three to one.2**
At first, spinning and weaving was subsidiary to their work on the 
land. Peasants sometimes turned to artisanal activities when farmwork 
slackened. But I suspect that as opportunities for commercial gain 
increased, particularly in the 1790’s, a population of professional weavers 
sprang up in the towns and loosely associated themselves in craft 
guilds.30 As the demand for yarn increased, women also allocated less 
time to agricultural chores. This was particularly so because short -  
fibered cotton was more cumbersome than wool to manipulate. It 
required more labor and concentration to align the fibers and turn cotton 
into yarn than to spin wool. Unlike Andean women of the highlands 
who spun wool as they watched over their herds, the cotton spinners of 
C ochabam ba could not easily combine spinning and shepherding. 
Demand for cotton yarn must have drawn peasant women off the land 
into their huts and to the river banks where they cleaned the cotton or 
stretched the fabric to be dyed with imported indigo.3* T hus, while rural 
people initially turned to handicrafts to supplement and complement 
agricultural activiities, as one of the few economic strategies available to 
peasants unwilling to emigrate to eastern plantations or other parts, the 
prospects o r possibility of earning their subsistence entirely from  craft 
production impelled some people to devote themselves entirely to their 
trade. At a certain point, certainly in the year 1799 when H aenke wrote 
his report on the province’s industry, ’’inferior classes of people [were] 
able to earn the better part of their subsistence from this industry.”32
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For the moment, at least, some peasants had managed to diversify 
their household economy in ways that presaged the diverse, comple­
mentary commercial, industrial, and agricultural activities of the valley 
smallholders of Cochabam ba in the mid -  twentieth century.
T he expansion of textile production was not exclusively the conse­
quence of spontaneous peasant economic diversification into artisan 
activities, however. Large num bers of smallholders shifted their produc­
tive efforts towards industry probably because merchants provided 
incentives (or exported pressures) for them  to do so. Particularly in the 
1790’s, when political and economic circumstances changed radically as 
we shall see shortly, merchants and enterprising landlords probably 
deployed credit devices to stimulate textile production and increase their 
control over the distribution of woven cloth. Yet the material records 
leave few traces of a fullscale putting -  out system in operation, except 
for an occasional notarial entry showing a m erchant seeking repayment 
from a tocuyo spinner who had accumulated a debt to the claim ant.3^
T he relatively minor role that C ochabam ba’s merchants played in the 
organization of textile production contrasts sharply with the dominance 
of merchant capital in cotton textiles in the Puebla region of Mexico 
during the late colonial period. As G .P .C . Thom son discusses in his 
article in this volume, m erchant capital virtually controlled the cotton 
cloth industry in Puebla throughout the late eighteenth and early nine­
teenth centuries. Though ’’...m erchants’ interest in the [Mexican] indus­
try fluctuated, ... even in the worst periods of recession ... m erchant 
capital can be found fom enting cotton agriculture, financing the trans­
portation and distribution of raw cotton, financing weavers’ production, 
and marketing their products.”35 Puebla’s textile industry was older, 
more capitalized and vertically integrated, and more highly specialized 
than the tocuyo industry in the southern Andes in the same period. 
Indeed, Puebla’s merchants and artisans in the early eighteenth century 
already had staked out a corner of the textile market in that colony by 
orienting production around a specialized, high -  quality garm ent, the 
rebozo, which benefitted from  silk weaving techniques known to local 
artisans, who learned to apply them to cotton weaving. Puebla’s looms 
produced a product that was marketable fa r beyond the boundaries of 
the regional economy. Set against the entrenched, specialized industry of 
Puebla, textile m anufacturing in C ochabam ba appeared to be a preca­
rious industry still fairly atomized am ong an artisanry which had strong 
ties to the land. M erchant capital never exercized the same degree of 
control over tocuyo production in Cochabam ba that it had achieved in
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the Puebla industry by the early eighteenth century. Even when com­
mercial conditions changed for the better in the late 1790’s, C ochabam ­
b a ’s m erchants failed to capture control of the industry or alter its 
structure of production in any enduring way.
II. W ar and the Textile Bonanza
Although Viedm a was a Physiocrat at heart, he never doubted the 
im portance of developing C ochabam ba’s industry. O ne of his pet charity 
projects, in fact, was the resurrection of a wool textile factory in the 
old, abandoned obraje of Hulincate located in the Sacaba valley. It was 
to be state -  run and financed (through a provincial tax on chicha 
consumption) and designed to employ poor and marginally productive 
m embers of society. Like the Indians of the jungle ex — mission villages, 
these industrial workers were to learn the ’’arts” of spinning and 
weaving.36 Yet, however laudatory his proposal for this obra pía  and his 
plan to provide employment for the hum ble classes, V iedm a was 
unwilling to challenge Spain’s restrictions on industrial growth in the 
colonies, even as the tide of Spanish trade in textiles to the Viceroyalty 
of La Plata grew heavier in the 1780’s. ’ ' A fter 1778, European textiles 
and the calicoes of the East Indies stiffened the competition that itinerant 
peddlars of inferior tocuyo cloth inevitably faced in distant marketplaces. 
It was not until w ar tem porarily halted that transatlantic trade flow that 
V iedm a and a few local investors seriously considered local industry as a 
solution to the chronic problems of idleness, under — employment, and 
capital shortage.
Cochabam ba experienced an extraordinary m anufacturing bonanza 
between 1796 and 1802, when trade between Europe and the southern 
Atlantic pons collapsed as a result of w ar and the breakdown of Spanish 
military control of the La Plata river basin. In 1796, after Britain 
declared w ar on Spain, the superior British navy moved into the mouth 
of La Plata and sealed off the port of Buenos Aires from the outside 
world. Sudden economic isolation in the midst of Spain’s im perial crisis 
afforded a tremendous stimulus to the Viceroyalty’s fledgling 
industries. Across the pam pas, in Chile and Alto Peru, urban consu­
mers of all social classes now turned inward to local sources of supply 
for their cotton, woolen and linen textiles.39 Those regions like Cocha­
bam ba, C órdoba, T ucum án, and A requipa which already possessed a 
local industrial base, however primitive in organization, had a new lease 
on their economic lives.40 T he event of w ar and its side effects provided
157
more incentive, theoretically at least, for peasant households to diversify 
their economic activities, local m erchants to invest more capital in 
long -  distance trade in cloth, and established artisans to put more spin­
ning wheels and treadle looms into use. But whether strong and sudden 
market incentive had a more profound and lasting effect, either upon the 
internal reorganization of textile production into capitalist or semi -  
capitalist enterprises or upon the regional class structure, is an entirely 
separate question that merits comparative research on specific regional 
economies. The textile bonanza of Cochabam ba is a case study of rapid 
industrial growth in the absence of any real transform ation in social 
productive relations.
A fter 1796, C ochabam ba became one of the main suppliers of rustic 
cotton textiles to cities throughout the Viceroyalty of La Plata. In  his 
1788 report, V iedm a had estimated that cloth worth 60,000 pesos left 
Cochabam ba for ’’outside provinces” (excluding the eastern districts of 
M izque, etc., which absorbed abour 15,000 pesos worth of tocuyo). In 
1798, Pedro Canals, the provincial treasurer, stated that registered tocuyo 
exports for the year 1797 had been valued at 88,085 pesos (at the unit 
price of two reales per vara, the same unit price V iedm a recorded in 
1793).41 This represented a 47 percent increase over the 1793 estimates. 
T he treasurer further estimated that in the first three months of 1798, 
tocuyo exports were worth 46,156 pesos. This was more than three times 
the tocuyo exponed in a three -  month period in 1793. Increasingly, 
tocuyo was in demand in distant markets. In 1799, the registry of the 
Alcaldía of Buenos Aires listed m erchants importing large amounts of 
tocuyo from  C ochabam ba.42
T he increasing dem and for tocuyo beyond the boundaries of the 
province was reflected in the gradual increase in its local price. In the 
1780’s it rarely sold for more than one and a half real; in 1793 its price 
was two reales. By 1799, a vara of tocuyo usually sold for two and a 
half reales. In Buenos Aires in 1798, the price was sometimes as high as 
three and a half reales.4  ^ U nder the stimulus of external dem and more 
looms were employed in cotton textile production. T he opening of the 
markets at Potosí and Buenos Aires for tocuyo cloth during a period 
when less silver was drained out of the Viceroyalty by Spanish and 
British m erchants seemed to offer the solution to C ochabam ba’s eco­
nomic anem ia. England’s belligerency had ostensibly created favorable 
trade conditions which would channel currency to the province and trig­
ger an economic boom for spinners, weavers and merchants in Cocha­
bam ba. It soon became clear, however, that the windfall profits many
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had hoped would enrich them overnight were not to be realized unless 
new supplies of raw cotton were found.
T he overnight boom in tocuyo production made the region increas­
ingly dependent on the raw cotton produced in the Peruvian coastal area 
around M oquegua and in the vicinity of Arequipa. V iedm a estimated 
that in 1788 Cochabam ba imported about 11,000 arrobas of cotton at 
two pesos, four reales per arroba.44 In 1798 he reported that the pro­
vince annually consumed about 30,000 arrobas of cotton. T he best 
quality cotton came from the coast and cost as much as six pesos in 
1798.45
C ochabam ba’s dependence on imported cotton concerned V iedm a and 
other officials and m erchants who saw that much of the income from 
tocuyo only left the province in the pockets of cotton traders. In 1798, 
V iedm a reported that 180,000 pesos flowed out of the region to Arequi­
pa and the coast.46 It was the cotton planters of coastal Peru who 
seemed to be reaping the greatest profits from the tocuyo boom. Viedma 
petitioned the Viceroy and king for permission to cultivate cotton in 
Santa Cruz.
Perhaps the greatest exponent of local cotton production was the 
naturalist, T adeo Haenke. H is famous 1799 essay (published in the 
Telégrafo M ercantil of Buenos Aires in 1801) explained the benefits of 
growing cotton in C ochabam ba’s semitropical frontiers. H e urged the 
Crown to allow the province to break its economic dependence on coastal 
Peru by becoming se lf-su ffic ien t in cotton. H e estimated that the 
province alone consumed 30 to 40,000 arrobas of cotton each year, not 
to mention the cotton needed for tocuyos the region exported. Haenke 
made a strong case.
[This cotton] is the fuel for the tocuyo trade which not only brings consi­
derable benefits to this city; it also provides employment for the inferior class 
of people who earn the better part of their living from this industry... The 
tocuyos of Cochabamba are so inferior and backward that they are compar­
able to cotton cloth from  Asia. D uring the present war, tocuyos have been the 
only resource of these interior provinces. W ith the end of communication 
with Europe and the complete lack of [Spanish, English and Asian] textiles, 
many individuals would have found themselves naked had it not been for 
C ochabam a’s tocuyos. In consideration of all the circumstances of these 
colonies and of the moral character of their inhabitants, it is not only use­
ful, but necessary, to foment the cultivation of cotton in every way possible 
and to develop the cotton textile industry which presently is in its infancy.47
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Hacnke went on to enum erate the reasons why the Crown should 
perm it the large -  scale production of cotton and tocuyo in Cochabam ba. 
His main argum ent was that Spain’s own textile industry would not be 
harm ed by his proposal. H igh transport costs and royal taxes on the 
export of raw cotton to Spain and more taxes on imported Spanish tex­
tiles made the cloth a relatively high priced item of consumption; its 
market in C ochabam ba was consequently restricted to the upper class. 
Haenke argued that other European nations, namely England, realized 
the benefits accruing to the metropolitan country of having abundant 
supplies of raw cotton produced in its overseas colonies, in North 
America and India. T he cotton produced in India was woven into cheap 
calicoes, some of which was exported by the Philippine Com pany to the 
Spanish colonies. Furtherm ore, Haenke argued, the textile factories in 
Spain could not meet the needs of all the Spanish colonies, whose 
population was rising steadily. Only the growth of manufactories in the 
colonies would begin to meet the needs of the poor for cheap cloth.4®
T he naturalist offered one further argum ent for royal sponsorship of 
local cotton cultivation and tocuyo m anufacturing. H e expounded on the 
need to develop a m anufacturing sector to absorb the growing population 
of landless mestizos and cholos in C ochabam ba. Outside of agriculture, 
he said, there was no industry to absorb the growing population of 
underemployed peasants and laboring poor and the large floating mass of 
vagrants. The growth of a rustic textile industry, Haenke argued, would 
absorb a vast num ber of the region’s poor. Like the neo -  mercantilists 
of his day, Haenke believed that a healthy economy depended on the 
employment of its population in industry or specialized agriculture. He 
appealed to the Crown to consider the benefits accruing to the state with 
the citizens of ’’these kingdoms” industrious and usefully em ployed.49 
This was to be the great panacea for the indolence and economic stag­
nation which Viedm a had publicly deplored in his 1788 report.
T he great campaign for local cotton cultivation and development of 
the tocuyo industry -  a campaign that probably peaked in 1801 with the 
publication of H aenke’s essay -  seemed to have burned itself out by 
1804. T he British lifted their blockade in 1802. By 1804 and 1805 royal 
income from alcabalas levied on imported European goods increased 
sharply.'’9
This probably indicated the entry into the province of large quantities 
of Spanish goods, particularly textiles. W hether they were actually sold 
in those years cannot be determined. But this is indirect evidence of the 
contraction of C ochabam ba’s export trade in tocuyos.
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As the new decade opened, the inspired and optimistic economic 
proposals of V iedm a and H aenke probably seemed futile to most obser­
ver. A new sense of realism seemed to pervade. T he few proposals for 
economic reform  written after 1802 were fa r less innovative than the 
earlier schemes. O ne of the longest reports was w ritten in 1804 by creole 
m erchant and adm inistrator (a regidor of the local Cabildo), Ju an  
Carrillo de A l b o r n o z . He  wrote of the European competition which 
had silenced many of the region’s 3,000 looms. But Carrillo de Albornoz 
did not even consider the issue of establishing cotton plantations in the 
eastern lowlands. His proposal centered around the need to impose 
tighter regulations on the quality of tocuyo woven in Cochabam ba. It 
was as if the vision of C ochabam ba’s progressive administrators had 
dimmed after the repeated opposition they had encountered not only 
from  the Crown, but from  the Audiencia of La Plata as well. W ith the 
end of the blockade, the industry seemed doomed. Carrillo de A lbornoz’s 
proposal to improve and standardize the quality of tocuyo cloth by 
regulating the size and num ber of combs in the looms was less the aim 
of an enlightened adm inistrator than the medieval remedy offered by a 
myopic m erchant who hated to see his profits from  tocuyo exports 
dwindle in the face of European com petition .^  Stricter regulation over 
the local guild of tocuyo weavers was a conservative m easure that 
threatened neither the Crow n, nor the Audiencia of La Plata nor the 
entrenched planter class on the Peruvian coast. O n the other hand, his 
proposal to restrict cloth production to those weavers who met municipal 
regulations presumably would improve the quality of the finished cloth 
and raise tocuyo prices.
T he proposal of Carrillo de Albornoz reflected his class biases. For 
the wholesale m erchant, like Carrillo de Albornoz, who wanted a com­
modity that continued to be marketable in Potosí and Buenos Aires after 
the blockade was lifted, a price rise of several reales would probably 
make little difference. But for the weaver and petty trader who depended 
on the mass consumption of local Indians and mestizos for their returns, 
tighter guild regulations and standardized production could spell ruin. 
W hen the plan came before the Consulado of Buenos Aires in 1806, the 
ministers came down on the side of the m erchants by approving 
measures to restrict and control tocuyo production . ^  Yet, despite these 
new measures, most administrators and m erchants realized that the 
tocuyo industry and merchants would w ither and turn inward once again 
to supply the local p l e b e . The  new age of prosperity, an age that 
V iedm a and H aenke hoped would rival early colonial times when
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C ochabam ba nourished the silver mining towns with grains, was not to 
be realized.
Conclusions
W ho were the beneficiaries of this brief expansion in tocuyo exports? 
W as there any perceptible shift in wealth distribution as a result of the 
boom? According to rough contemporary estimates, about 1,000 weavers 
joined the ranks of the tocuyo producers during the boom. T here was 
more employment or semi -  employment in this industry because of the 
flourishing export trade. If  there were approximately 3,000 weavers in 
Cochabam ba by 1800 and most were mestizos or cholos, as Haenke 
reported, then about seven percent of the total mixed blood population 
(as estimated by V iedm a in 1788) was engaged in tocuyo weaving 
alone.55 Most profits, however, were generated in the distributive rather 
than productive process, in the long -  distance, wholesale trade in tocuyo. 
It is difficult to calculate the average rate of return from the wholesale 
export of tocuyo to Potosí or Buenos Aires. But it was undoubtedly less 
than 50 percent. D uring the campaign to get royal consent to cultivate 
cotton in the Intendancy of C ochabam ba, local officials argued that the 
lower cost of locally grown cotton would allow m erchants to realize a net 
profit of 50 percent on the sale of tocuyo in Buenos Aires (at the 
current market price of three and one -  half reales per vara). Officials 
arrived at this estimate simply because the market price in Buenos Aires 
was about 75 percent higher than in the local m arket.'’®
T he profits from this trade accrued mostly to a small group of 
merchants who monopolized control over the carriage trade. T he serious 
shortage of pack animals in the Cochabam ba province since the 1780’s 
threw long -  distance trade into the hands of wealthy m erchants and 
landowners who owned mule trains or commissioned muleteers to bulk 
and carry the cloth to those markets. In 1801, several sub -  delegates 
registered complaints with the Consulado about the monopolistic cloth 
merchants. Even when they agreed to carry cargoes for other traders and 
artisans, they charged freight prices far in excess of the stipulated rates 
and they demanded cash advances.57 This situation virtually excluded all 
but a few wholesalers from  participating directly in the lo n g -d istan ce  
tocuyo trade. Few artisans, if any, were in a position to experience 
bootstrap mobility or to turn their workshops into small factories 
employing wage workers.
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If the profits of the tocuyo boom accrued to but a handful of local 
merchants and thus further concentrated wealth within the elite, who 
precisely were these merchants? Notarial books and wills show that the 
sons of large landowners who held property themselves made large 
investments in tocuyo exports to Buenos Aires and other cities. Cocha­
bam ba’s largest tocuyo wholesalers were not only large landowners; their 
prestige and power also rested on high positions in the local militia or 
political office. Francisco G arcía Claros, for example, was a large tocuyo 
exporter and held the position of Royal Receptor of Alcabalas; Juan  
José Eras y Gandarillas, a large m erchant who inherited rich maize land 
(maicas) on the outskirts of Cochabam ba and who owned haciendas in 
Quillacollo in 1808; Francisco V entura Valiente, probably the largest 
tocuyo merchant, was a lieutenant in the militia; and Ju an  Carrillo de 
Albornoz, a large tocuyo exporter and the advocate of guild regulations, 
was a perpetual m em ber of the Cabildo. Those who reaped the profits 
from the trade were clearly not merchants moving up the social ladder. 
They were w ell-estab lished , respected mem bers of landed society who 
exercised power in the province. These merchants occupied the upper 
stratum  of provincial society which managed to hold on to its landed 
properties. They composed part of the landed elite which speculated in 
tithes, bonded one another, and married endogamously. It was this small 
group of m erchants in the last years of the colonial period who were the 
only substantial money lenders aside from the monasteries. W hat little 
wealth they accumulated from  the textile bonanza was probably sunk into 
usurious ventures, land, and tithes. Few merchants were willing to 
invest mercantile capital in cash -  crop agriculture in the eastern 
lowlands, as V iedm a had hoped they would. N or were the merchants 
interested in revolutionizing the textile industry. T he windfall profits 
from tocuyo expons seemed only to tie them more tightly into the local 
rentier economy.
T hus, the great tocuyo export boom of 17 9 6 - 1802 did not signal the 
beginning of a transition towards capitalist enterprises in the region. 
M erchants did not plough their new -  found wealth into the productive 
process, altering either the forces or relations of production. Despite their 
financial capacity and the new political climate in which Haenke wrote 
his famous tract on the benefits of industry, the moneyed middlemen 
remained locked in their old ways, unwilling to diversify their invest­
ments or restructure the textile industry. This is certainly not surprising, 
given the opportunities and constraints they faced, particularly the fluc­
tuation in market dem and for tocuyos in distant cities. Indeed, they
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seemed only too aware of the evanescence of the lucrative, lo n g ­
distance trade in tocuyos. Beneficiaries of an artificial situation, that 
underm ined the very principles upon which the colonial regime rested 
and that would end the moment the British interlopers were expelled, the 
m erchants had little incentive to establish the kind of factories that 
Haenke prescribed. Furtherm ore, the progressive, pro -  industry forces in 
the region ran up against resolute opposition from the Viceroy and the 
Audiencia to their efforts to promote cotton plantations in the semi -  
tropical lowlands of M izque and Santa C ruz. Raw material costs and the 
difficulties of procuring cotton from coastal traders on a steady basis 
placed a dead weight on industrial expansion, apart from the shifting 
winds of the market.
If the textile bonanza marked the failed  transition to nascent capitalist 
development in this Andean region, it must have left an indelible 
im print on the political consciousness of many people in the region. 
Artisans and m erchants alike witnessed the spectacular commercial 
opportunities afforded by the naval blockade. For one ephemeral moment 
the provincial elite saw some of the barriers to regional economic 
growth begin to crum ble. T he ’’chronic idleness” of C ochabam ba’s 
sub -  altern classes seemed to evaporate before their eyes, as peasants 
and urban artisans turned their energy into spinning and weaving as 
never before. And for the first time, a few mem bers of the elite capi­
talized on the rustic cottons. T he ideological implications of their collec­
tive experience could not have been lost on even the most staunch 
royalists. It is surely no coincidence, moreover, that following Inde­
pendence the m erchants and artisans of Cochabam ba collectively were 
the young nation’s strongest advocates of protectionism against the 
onslaught of British traders.
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